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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge,  
This case is the latest in the years-long antitrust battle 
over whether GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals (“Teva”) violated the antitrust laws through 
their settlement agreement to end an unrelated patent dispute 
over GSK’s brand drug Lamictal and Teva’s generic form 
lamotrigine.  We need not reach the antitrust issues here, 
however, for we are concerned at present only with the District 
Court’s class certification analysis, specifically whether 
common issues pertaining to the class predominate over 
individual issues.   
Though judges must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of 
the facts, evidence, and arguments submitted at the class 
certification stage, the District Court certified this class without 
undertaking the analysis needed by failing to resolve key 
factual disputes, assess competing evidence, and weigh 
conflicting expert testimony, all of which bear heavily on 
satisfaction of the predominance requirement.  Moreover, the 
Court confused injury with damages, despite our precedent 
distinguishing the two and applying a different predominance 
standard to each.  In this context, we cannot determine whether 
common issues predominate, and thus we vacate and remand 
for a redo. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
GSK is a pharmaceutical manufacturer that holds the 
patent to an anti-epilepsy drug called Lamictal.  It began selling 
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Lamictal in 1994, and its patent was set to expire in early 2009.  
A patent generally excludes all other competitors from 
producing a drug with the same active ingredient until patent 
expiration.  See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2015).   
Teva is a drug maker that manufactures a generic 
version of Lamictal called lamotrigine.  Importantly, it sought 
to begin marketing lamotrigine before GSK’s patent on 
Lamictal expired.  
Congress provided a pathway for Teva to do so through 
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.1  The Act permits a generic 
drug manufacturer seeking Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) approval to submit an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”) that relies on the brand drug’s safety 
and efficacy studies submitted as part of that drug’s New Drug 
Application.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j).  Of several bases for filing an 
ANDA, one is known as a “paragraph IV” certification, in 
which the would-be generic manufacturer certifies that any 
patent protecting the brand drug is either invalid or would not 
be infringed by the new generic.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  The 
Act encourages generic manufacturers to enter the market by 
granting the first generic to file an ANDA with paragraph IV 
certification (the “first filer”) a 180-day exclusivity period 
during which only that generic, along with the brand drug, may 
be marketed.  See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)–(iv).  This exclusivity 
period is immensely profitable for the generic because it 
effectively grants the first filer a temporary monopoly over the 
generic market.  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 144 
(2013).  Because generics can rely on the safety and efficacy 
studies of the brand drug, they need not engage in their own 
 
1 The Act is officially referred to as the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 
98 Stat. 1585. 
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lengthy and expensive clinical trials, and so they are priced 
below that of the brand.  See id. at 142.  
When a generic certifies on its ANDA that the brand’s 
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic, that 
certification “automatically counts as patent infringement,” 
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143, and often “provok[es] litigation” from 
the brand.  In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 244 
(3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 29, 2016) (citation omitted).  
If so, FDA approval of the generic is withheld for 30 months 
or until resolution of the litigation, whichever comes first.  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 
396 n.9.     
In April 2002, Teva filed the relevant paragraph IV 
ANDAs, and GSK followed suit by suing for patent 
infringement.  See King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 397 (reciting the 
history of this litigation).  But after Teva received a favorable 
ruling in a bench trial with respect to one of the infringement 
claims in 2005, the parties settled.  As part of the settlement, 
Teva would begin selling lamotrigine on July 22, 2008, six 
months before it could have had GSK won the lawsuit, but later 
than it could have had it succeeded in litigation.  In exchange, 
GSK promised not to launch its own generic version of 
Lamictal, known as an “authorized generic” (“AG”).    
AGs are generics launched by the brand manufacturer 
itself (or an authorized third-party distributor) via the brand’s 
drug application rather than by a separate manufacturer via an 
ANDA.  See FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short–Term 
Effects and Long-Term Impact 1, 12 (2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf.  
Had the parties not settled and had Teva succeeded in the 
patent litigation, it would have been entitled to the 180-day 
exclusivity period as the generic first filer.  But GSK 
nonetheless could have launched an AG to compete with 
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Teva’s generic drug, as an AG is submitted as part of the 
brand’s own drug application.  King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 
395–96.  If the brand manufacturer, however, agrees not to 
launch an AG, the potential antitrust concern is the agreement 
will reduce competition, thereby keeping prices higher for 
longer and harming consumer welfare.  See id. at 404–05.      
That brings us to the issue in this case.  After GSK and 
Teva settled the patent litigation, plaintiffs—companies that 
directly purchased brand Lamictal from GSK or lamotrigine 
from Teva (“Direct Purchasers”)—filed suit, claiming the 
settlement violated the antitrust laws as an impermissible 
“reverse payment agreement” whereby GSK “paid” Teva to 
stay out of the market by promising not to launch an AG.2  
They argue that but for the alleged reverse payment, Teva 
would have launched lamotrigine sooner and GSK would have 
launched an AG the very day Teva entered the market.  As a 
result, they contend they paid more for the drugs than they 
would have otherwise.  Their theory of liability, at least with 
respect to those entities that purchased lamotrigine from Teva 
during the six-month period, is premised on the principle that, 
on average, the price of a generic is lower when there are two 
generics rather than just one.   
GSK and Teva contend that even though GSK was 
precluded by the settlement from launching an AG, it still 
competed with Teva on price during the exclusivity period 
 
2 We previously reversed the grant of GSK and Teva’s motion 
to dismiss in King Drug Co., holding the “no-AG agreement 
falls under Actavis’s rule because it may represent an unusual, 
unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value from the 
patentee to the alleged infringer and may therefore give rise to 
the inference that it is a payment to eliminate the risk of 
competition.”  791 F.3d at 394. 
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through its so-called Contracting Strategy.  GSK claims that it 
had long been concerned about the effectiveness of launching 
an AG because doctors seemed more reluctant to switch 
patients from one epilepsy drug to another, meaning that those 
who started patients on brand Lamictal would be less inclined 
to switch them to a lower-priced generic once one launched.  
Thus GSK planned to take advantage of this nuance in the anti-
epilepsy drug market and compete aggressively with Teva on 
price by contracting with targeted pharmacies to offer them 
significant discounts and rebates if they agreed to sell brand 
Lamictal instead of Teva’s generic version.  Further, and 
critical to their defense, GSK and Teva assert that the latter 
learned about this strategy before it began selling lamotrigine, 
and thus it preemptively lowered its lamotrigine prices in order 
to compete.  As a result, GSK and Teva argue that some Direct 
Purchasers never paid more for lamotrigine than they would 
have absent the settlement.   
The Direct Purchasers moved to certify a class of all 
companies that purchased Lamictal directly from GSK or 
generic lamotrigine from Teva.  That noted, GSK and Teva 
challenge only certification as to the members who purchased 
generic lamotrigine from Teva (hence any reference to the 
Direct Purchasers that follows is limited to those Direct 
Purchasers).  The District Court certified the class; at issue is 
whether this holds up.  
GSK and Teva brought this timely interlocutory appeal.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1337.  We granted GSK and Teva’s petition for 
leave to appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 
and so have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).   
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We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if a district court’s decision rests on a 
“clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.” In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2009), as 
amended (Jan. 16, 2009) (citation omitted). “[W]hether an 
incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be 
reviewed de novo.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted).  A District Court “errs as a matter of law when it fails 
to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute relevant to 
determining the requirements” of Rule 23.  Id. at 320. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Analysis Required to Certify a Class 
1. The Basics 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) set the 
requirements for class certification.  Rule 23(a) requires that  
(1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) 
there must be questions of law or fact common 
to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties must be 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class 
(typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs must 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class (adequacy of representation, or simply 
adequacy).   
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590–91 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Rule 
23(b)(3), as relevant here, “requires that (i) common questions 
of law or fact predominate (predominance), and (ii) the class 
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action is the superior method for adjudication (superiority).”  
Id. (citation omitted). 
GSK and Teva challenge only the District Court’s 
predominance finding.  Stated more expansively, a plaintiff 
“must ‘demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is 
capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to 
the class rather than individual to its members.’”  Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311).  “Because the nature of the 
evidence that will suffice to resolve a question determines 
whether the question is common or individual, a district court 
must formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will 
play out in order to determine whether common or individual 
issues predominate in a given case.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “If 
proof of the essential elements of the cause of action requires 
individual treatment, then class certification is unsuitable.”  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (citation omitted). 
To determine whether the putative class has satisfied 
predominance (indeed, all applicable Rule 23 requirements), 
the District Court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the 
evidence and arguments presented.  Id. at 309 (quoting Gen. 
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).  That 
involves three key aspects.  First, the court must “find[]” that 
the requirements of Rule 23 are met and any “[f]actual 
determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 307.  Second, “the court 
must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class 
certification, even if they overlap with the merits.”  Id; see also 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) 
(“That [overlap] cannot be helped.”); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 
(“Rule 23 gives no license to shy away from making factual 
findings that are necessary to determine whether the Rule’s 
requirements have been met.”).  Third, the court must consider 
“all relevant evidence and arguments,” including “expert 
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testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class 
certification or by a party opposing it.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 307.  If, after all that, the Court is convinced by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs’ claims are 
capable of common proof at trial, then the predominance 
requirement is satisfied.   
2. The Predominance Inquiry Here 
The Direct Purchasers contend that they need not prove 
antitrust injury at this stage, but rather it suffices if they show 
only that injury is capable of common proof at trial.  True 
enough.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12.  But 
they go further and say that our case is controlled by a comment 
in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), that 
suggests an even lower standard for predominance whereby 
that criterion is satisfied unless no reasonable juror could 
believe the common proof at trial. 
In Tyson Foods, the Supreme Court was reviewing a 
motion to decertify a class brought under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., after 
a jury had already rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
class.  In considering whether representative evidence was 
sufficient to satisfy the predominance requirement, the Court 
wrote that “[t]he District Court could have denied class 
certification on this ground only if it concluded that no 
reasonable juror could have believed that the employees spent 
roughly equal time donning and doffing” their protective gear.  
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (emphasis added).  According 
to the Direct Purchasers, this means that so long as their 
evidence of class-wide antitrust injury could sustain a jury 
finding, they meet the predominance requirement.   
But contrary to the Direct Purchasers’ assertion, Tyson 
Foods does not control our case, and its no-reasonable-juror 
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statement certainly does not overturn our longstanding rule 
announced in Hydrogen Peroxide, and reiterated in many a 
case, that a putative class must demonstrate that its claims are 
capable of common proof at trial by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See, e.g., Modafinil, 837 F.3d at 248–49; Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 591; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 
219–20 (3d Cir. 2012) (subsequent history omitted).  First, 
Tyson Foods was discussing representative evidence in the 
FLSA context, a unique labor situation in which, often due to 
inadequate record keeping, “a representative sample [of 
employees] may be the only feasible way to establish liability.”  
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1040; see also Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 685–88 (1946).  In those 
cases, the accuracy and representativeness of the sample is 
critical, for each class member must be able to rely on that 
evidence in his own trial to prove liability under the FLSA.  
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.  Indeed, the only two Courts 
of Appeals to pick up on this language did so in that context.  
See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 
940–41 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding in an FLSA case that the “no 
reasonable juror” standard applies to admissible expert 
testimony at the class certification stage); Monroe v. FTS USA, 
LLC, 860 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 2017) (suggesting in an FLSA 
case, albeit in dicta, that Tyson Foods’s “no reasonable juror” 
comment “concerned how district courts should assess the 
representativeness of an expert’s statistical average for class 
certification purposes”).   Second, the Court in Tyson Foods 
was asked to decertify a class after the jury had rendered a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff class, but, finding the jury could 
reasonably have relied on the representative evidence, it 
declined to do so.  136 S. Ct. at 1047–48.  Here, by contrast, 
the District Court reviewed the class certification motion on a 
blank slate.   
Our non-FLSA class certification decisions that post-
date Tyson Foods have reiterated that district courts are 
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required, per Hydrogen Peroxide, to resolve factual 
determinations by a preponderance of the evidence at the class 
certification stage.3  See, e.g., Ferreras v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
946 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2019) ; Mielo v. Steak 'n Shake 
Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2018); 
Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, 833 F.3d 298, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  We hold that our standard—plaintiffs must prove 
their claim is capable of common proof by a predominance of 
the evidence—continues to apply to class certification 
determinations outside of the FLSA context.   
With that in mind, we turn to the Direct Purchasers’ 
claim.  The injury element is at issue here.  Recall that their 
theory of liability is that they suffered an antitrust injury 
because but for the reverse-settlement agreement, each would 
have paid less for lamotrigine than it actually did.  This requires 
the Direct Purchasers to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they could establish, through common proof at 
trial, facts supporting an antitrust injury, namely: 1) GSK 
would have launched an AG but for the reverse-settlement; and 
2) as a result, all class members would have paid less for 
lamotrigine in this but-for world.  If each individual class 
member could rely on this same proof to prove the elements of 
its claim, then the injury is capable of common proof at trial.   
3. Whether the Direct Purchasers’ Claims 
Are Capable of Common Proof 
GSK and Teva opposed certification, arguing before the 
District Court that the Direct Purchasers were unable to show 
that injury is capable of common proof at trial because their 
proof impermissibly relies on averages, which, in a market 
 
3 We recognize that whether the Tyson Foods no-reasonable-
juror standard should control was not squarely presented in 
those cases.   
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characterized by individual negotiations and a discounted-
brand competition strategy, masks the fact that many—up to 
one-third of the entire class—likely paid no more, or even less, 
for lamotrigine than they would have if GSK had launched an 
AG.  Because each class member could not rely on the same 
common evidence to show injury, individual issues 
predominate; hence they contend the District Court erred by 
accepting the Direct Purchasers’ expert testimony that relied 
on these averages without conducting a rigorous analysis of the 
competing expert reports and resolving the competing factual 
disputes on which the reports rely.  
 
We agree that a more rigorous analysis is needed.  The 
District Court refused to “address the multi-leveled 
microeconomic analysis of what each Defendant would or 
would not have possibly done in the but-for world, and instead 
focuse[d] on whether the presence of the Contracting Strategy 
raises individualized issues that defeat predominance.”  In re 
Lamictal Indirect Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litig., No. 
12-CV-00995, 2018 WL 6567709, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 
2018).  Without that inquiry, it is impossible to determine 
whether the Contracting Strategy raised individualized issues.  
  
The Direct Purchasers’ expert, Dr. Russell Lamb, 
opined that evidence common to the proposed class as a whole 
“demonstrates that the prices paid by all or nearly all proposed 
Class members for lamotrigine tablets were impacted 
(artificially inflated) by the allegedly illegal agreement 
between GSK and Teva,” and thus the class was “injured by 
the Defendants’ alleged[ly] anticompetitive conduct.”  J.A. 
487–88.  This “common evidence” includes: (1) economic 
literature showing that, on average, prices of generics are lower 
as more enter the market; (2) Teva’s own general pricing 
forecast tending to discount a generic by 50% without 
competition, but by 65% when facing an additional competitor; 
and (3) transaction-level sales data showing that the average 
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actual price paid was consistent with these predictions.  Lamb 
also created a model purporting to show the price each 
purchaser would have paid absent the settlement, and he 
opined that the prices would have been lower both had GSK 
just launched an AG4 and had it launched an AG along with 
the Contracting Strategy.  But, as GSK and Teva accurately 
point out, that model still relies on an average hypothetical 
price, which again fails to account for individual negotiations 
or the effect of GSK’s Contracting Strategy on each Direct 
Purchaser. 
 
GSK and Teva’s expert, Dr. James Hughes, countered 
that it is “not possible, absent individualized inquiry, to 
determine whether any particular member of the proposed 
[c]lass suffered injury in the form of higher prices as a result 
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct.”  J.A. 265–66.  He 
rebutted many of Dr. Lamb’s findings, primarily criticizing the 
use of averages—contending that Lamb committed 
“meaningful error” when he assumed an aggregate “actual” 
price that he applied to all class-members, which failed to 
acknowledge that purchasers paid “dramatically different 
prices,” dropped charge-backs and discounts, and ignored low 
“outlier” prices.  Further, Dr. Hughes criticized Dr. Lamb’s 
reliance on general forecasting documents using average 
prices, rather than lamotrigine-specific prices.  Hughes created 
his own model, using lamotrigine-specific prices from Teva 
company documents, to show that, when accounting for Teva’s 
preemptive response to the Contracting Strategy, the price of 
 
4 While the parties dispute whether GSK would have used both 
strategies—launching an AG and engaging in the Contracting 
Strategy—simultaneously, Lamb conducted a “sensitivity 
analysis” as part of his model purporting to show that, either 
way, the price of lamotrigine would have been lower absent the 
settlement agreement.   
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lamotrigine was likely lower for some purchasers than it would 
have been had GSK launched an AG.  Based on this, Hughes 
found that 25 of the 33 generic-only purchasers likely paid the 
same or lower prices in the actual world under the Contracting 
Strategy than they would have paid had GSK launched an AG.  
In effect, the amount each purchaser would have paid absent 
the settlement required an individual analysis because Teva did 
not respond to the Contracting Strategy uniformly.    
Here, the District Court abused its discretion when it 
assumed, absent a rigorous analysis, that averages are 
acceptable.  As is clear from the dueling expert reports, the 
acceptability of averages depends largely on the answer to 
several factual predicates, most importantly: 1) whether the 
market is characterized by individual negotiations; 2) whether 
Teva preemptively lowered its pricing in response to the 
Contracting Strategy; and 3) whether and to what extent GSK, 
absent the settlement agreement, would or could have pursued 
both the Contracting Strategy and an AG.  The Court did not 
resolve these factual disputes, which would have required it to 
weigh the competing evidence and make a prediction as to how 
they would play out at trial.  Further, much of each expert’s 
analysis turned on his sources of evidence for pricing and 
discounting data, many of which were in tension.  It was up to 
the District Court to scrutinize the evidence to determine what 
was credible and could be used in the expert analysis.   
This lack of analysis perhaps was due to the Court’s 
assumption that antitrust injury here occurred “at the moment 
the price of generic lamotrigine was artificially inflated by the 
no-AG agreement, even if GSK’s Contracting Strategy later on 
possibly eroded some or all of the inflated price.”  Lamictal, 
2018 WL 6567709, at *6.  But that assumption misunderstood 
GSK and Teva’s argument—the prices were never inflated to 
begin with because Teva preemptively lowered its prices 
before launching; thus some Direct Purchasers never suffered 
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an overcharge.  But the District Court cannot simply make that 
assumption—rather, whether Teva preemptively lowered its 
prices is a factual matter hotly contested by the parties.  And 
the Court was required to resolve that dispute by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
Thus, contrary to the District Court’s belief, addressing 
the micro-level analysis here, even though it touches on the 
merits, was necessary in order to determine whether the Direct 
Purchasers, in light of the competing expert reports and 
evidence, could show that common issues predominated by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  While averages may be 
acceptable where they do not mask individualized injury, see 
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 2011), 
we cannot determine whether that occurred here because of the 
lack of analysis.  Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the 
District Court to analyze the evidence and arguments 
submitted as part of class certification. 
B. Injury and Damages 
To compound matters, the District Court appears to 
have treated the parties’ arguments as a dispute about damages, 
rather than antitrust injury, reasoning that “[t]he use of 
averages to develop the aggregate amount of damages does not 
suggest [the Direct Purchasers] will be unable to ensure 
recovery is only for injured parties.”  Lamictal, 2018 WL 
6567709, at *6 (alteration in original) (emphases added) 
(citation omitted).  That was amiss, as averages here were used 
to show injury—i.e., the Direct Purchasers were overcharged 
for lamotrigine because of the reverse-settlement—in addition 
to damages.   
We have consistently distinguished injury from 
damages.  See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended 
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(Oct. 16, 2001) (“Proof of injury (whether or not an injury 
occurred at all) must be distinguished from calculation of 
damages (which determines the actual value of the injury).”).  
This is significant, as we apply a more lenient predominance 
standard for damages than for injury.  While every plaintiff 
must be able to show antitrust injury through evidence that is 
common to the class, see Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311, 
damages need not be “susceptible of measurement across the 
entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3),” Modafinil, 837 F.3d 
at 260 (citation omitted).  Accord Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 
1045 (“When one or more of the central issues in the action . . 
. can be said to predominate, the action may be considered 
proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important 
matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages . . . .”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  This merging 
of differing standards led the District Court to apply our more 
permissive damages standard to the class certification 
question, reasoning “that some generic purchasers were injured 
more or less strongly than others is not only permitted, but is a 
reason for why averages are appropriate in the damages 
calculation.”  Lamictal, 2018 WL 6567709, at *7 (footnote 
omitted).  This misreading also calls for a remand.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the District Court did not conduct a rigorous 
analysis of the competing expert reports that rely on competing 
evidence and assume competing facts, we are unable in the first 
instance to determine whether the Direct Purchasers have met 
the predominance requirement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Also, the Court incorrectly conflated injury with 
damages in its analysis.  We therefore vacate the class 
certification order and remand for the District Court to conduct 
the required analysis. 
 
